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Abstract
Since the onset of the pandemic, the equity market has experienced bouts of high 
volatility, with private investors’ use of derivatives for speculative purposes being cited as 
a relevant factor in some cases. This paper analyses two specific episodes: the revaluation 
of GameStop stock, and the swift rise and subsequent collapse of Archegos Capital. In 
both instances, the leverage provided by derivatives generated strains in the functioning of 
illiquid market segments in the form of trading feedback loops.
Keywords: equity derivatives, leverage, retail investors, feedback loops, market functioning.
JEL classification: G12, G13, G14.
Resumen
Desde el comienzo de la pandemia, el mercado de renta variable ha experimentado episodios 
de alta volatilidad. En alguno de ellos, el uso de derivados con fines especulativos por 
inversores privados ha sido citado como un factor relevante. En este documento se analizan 
dos casos concretos: la revalorización de la acción de GameStop, y el rápido ascenso y 
posterior caída del fondo Archegos Capital. En ambos, el apalancamiento facilitado por los 
derivados ha generado tensiones en el funcionamiento de segmentos de mercado poco 
líquidos en forma de ciclos retroalimentados de negociación.
Palabras clave: derivados de renta variable, apalancamiento, inversores minoristas, ciclos 
de retroalimentación, funcionamiento de mercado.
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1 Introduction
A financial derivative allows investors to hedge against changes in the price of the asset 
upon which it is based (the underlying asset). They can also be used to increase the exposure 
to the underlying asset beyond that assumed when directly purchasing the asset (intrinsic 
leverage), without needing to resort to direct financing for such purchases. This increases 
possible returns, but also magnifies potential losses.
This multiplying effect of exposures with the same amount of capital means that 
the taking or closing of derivatives-market positions can affect the underlying market. In 
the most extreme cases, excess leverage or a forced deleverage could put pressure on 
trading and generate feedback loops.1 The market structure, the use of equity derivatives 
and the friction caused by this leverage were key factors in the two bouts of volatility in 2021 
analysed in this paper. The GameStop stock price saw sharp movements and volatility in 
January, with notable activity on the part of retail investors in the exchange-traded stock 
options markets. As regards Archegos’ collapse in March, the use of bilateral derivative 
contracts with several investment banks was particularly noteworthy.
The social and economic effects of the pandemic have triggered greater volatility 
and significant cross-sector behavioural divergence, creating strong investment trends as 
information arrived on restrictions or signs of reopening (see Chart  1). Thus, in the case 
of GameStop and other firms supported by retail flows, many sophisticated investors bet 
against these companies, partly owing to the impact lockdown had on these firms, as 
most of them belong to the specialised retail trade and entertainment sector.2 Conversely, 
Archegos held leveraged positions in technology and communication firms, whose sectors 
had benefited from lockdown and an increased use of digital media. 
The vaccine roll-out and the first signs of economic reopening prompted a change 
in trend and investment flows among sectors from end-2020, adversely affecting bearish 
positions in firms like GameStop and bullish positions such as those in Archegos’ portfolio. 
As detailed in this paper, derivatives-market activity lies behind the heightening of the 
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"LOCKDOWN" AND "REOPENING" PORTFOLIOS FOR THE S&P 500 (a)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Bloomberg and own calculations.
a The Lockdown portfolio comprises S&P 500 firms benefiting from greater household consumption and entertainment, in the retail food and 
primary product, home delivery and communications sectors. The Reopening portfolio comprises firms benefiting from reopening expectations, 
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2 Equity derivatives: concepts and type
The equity derivatives most accessible to retail investors are options contracts listed on 
different regulated markets. These options can be to buy (call option) or to sell (put option). 
Thus, by paying the contract premium, a call option holder acquires the right to buy the 
underlying asset at a fixed price (the strike price) on the contract expiry date, thereby 
benefiting from increases in the stock price with a smaller initial payment. If the price falls 
below the strike price, the holder would not exercise the right and would lose the premium 
paid; but if it exceeds the strike price, they can buy the stock at below market price (see 
Chart 2.1). Among other strategies, investors buy a call option to position themselves ahead 
of possible increases in the underlying price, which requires a smaller investment than if 
the stock were purchased directly. At the same time, a put option entitles the holder to sell 
for a fixed price at a future date, thereby benefiting from possible declines in the underlying 
asset’s price.3
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts, i.e. those not traded through 
organised markets, are designed for specialised investors with access to investment banks’ 
brokerage services.4 The most widely used are equity swaps, which are structured as the 
swap of the total return of the underlying shares (total return swap), in the way that a contract 
for differences is5 (see Figure 1). The holder receives the changes in the share price and 
dividends and, in exchange, the counterparty (i.e. the investment bank) receives a variable 
payment, pegged to a benchmark interest rate (e.g. LIBOR) plus a spread, calculated so 
that the swap price at inception is zero. Thus, the investor is exposed to the market risk of 
the stock without having to make an initial payment. Collateral is provided by the investor 
to protect the counterparty in the event of default. The level of leverage will depend on the 
relationship between the total asset exposure and the collateral provided. If the stock 
price falls, these margins will need to be adjusted through a margin call to deposit more 
cash or collateral.
The counterparties for these derivatives must cover part of their position so as not to 
incur excessive risks. A significant concept of such hedging is the “delta”, or the sensitivity 
of the derivative’s price to changes in the price of the underlying asset. The delta determines 
the number of shares that need to be purchased to cover the risk of a given derivatives 
position, e.g. the stock that the call option writer must buy in order to avoid being exposed 
to changes in the underlying price. In an equity swap, the exposure to the underlying asset 
is linear and, therefore, these instruments have a delta equal to one. By contrast, call options 
have an asymmetric payoff, and their delta, rather than being constant, varies on the basis 
3   So-called European options can only be exercised upon maturity, while American options can be exercised beforehand. 
For a detailed analysis of options, their characteristics and pricing models, see Hull (2018).
4   See Avellaneda and Cont (2010) for an analysis of the different bilateral contracts concerning equity and of the market 
structure. 
5   Contracts for differences (CfDs) allow buyers to position themselves ahead of changes in equity, currencies or 
commodities without actually owning the underlying asset. Payments are made for the difference between the 
underlying asset’s price when the contract opens and when it closes; if the difference is negative, the buyer pays the 
seller, and vice versa.
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of the underlying asset’s price, i.e. it increases if the price goes up (see Chart  2.2). The 
gamma, which represents the sensitivity of the delta to changes in the underlying asset’s 
price, increases enormously when the price is around the strike price and the expiration is 
near (see Chart 2.3). Consequently, the dynamic hedging of the sale of a call option requires 
more underlying shares to be bought as their price approaches the strike price. When it is 
highly likely that the option will be exercised, the delta is close to one. 
CALL OPTION (STRIKE PRICE = 50) PRICE AND SENSITIVITY TO UNDERLYING PRICE AND MATURITY
Chart 2
SOURCE: Own calculations.
1  PRICE AMMAG  3ATLED  2
EQUITY SWAP FLOWS
Figure 1
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
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The notional amount of swaps has grown since 2008 and they now account for 
half of the total OTC segment (see Chart 3). However, the ratio of OTC derivatives to market 
capitalisation has decreased across all markets since the record highs reached in 2008. In 
the case of exchange-traded options, the number of traded contracts, especially in individual 
stock options and in call options, has risen since early 2020, peaking at over 60 million in 
January 2021 (see Chart 4). 
NOTIONAL AMOUNT OF OTC DERIVATIVES AND RATIO TO MARKET CAPITALISATION
Chart 3







































































































































































3  RATIO OF NOTIONAL AMOUNT OF OTC 
DERIVATIVES TO MARKET CAPITALISATION
VOLUME OF EXCHANGE-TRADED OPTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Chart 4
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2  CONTRACTS ON INDIVIDUAL STOCKS
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3 Market structure and participants
Regulatory and technological developments have driven structural changes in equity 
and derivatives markets across all jurisdictions, going from open outcry methods, with 
transactions being executed manually, to the widespread use of electronic trading, with 
automated executions. These changes have reduced the barriers to entry for new participants 
and fostered the emergence of new trading venues.
In this new environment, upon receiving a buy or sell order from a client, a 
broker-dealer can match the transaction in-house, if it has the capacity to do so (for 
example, by using its own electronic trading platform), or it can decide to send it to any 
of the multiple trading venues where the equity and corresponding derivatives are listed: 
traditional stock exchanges, third-party electronic communication networks or market-
makers’ platforms (see Figure 2).
The decision to send orders to a trading venue depends on the broker-dealer’s 
business model and is subject to minimising the transaction costs. For instance, online 
brokers, which are highly focused on retail investors, send orders to market-makers or 
liquidity providers (known as “wholesalers” or “internalisers”), which execute the orders. 
These market-makers intermediate between buyers and sellers, using their balance 
sheet and obtaining income from the bid-ask spread. The greater the number of orders 
received from individual investors, the smaller the risk that price movements will go 
against them.6 To encourage trades, they distribute part of the income they obtain to 
6   As the buy and sell orders are not placed for the same volume or at the same time, the market-maker has to manage 
this imbalance by temporarily increasing its inventory and assuming the market risk. The greater the retail flow (i.e. the 
number of small and disperse orders), the more likely it is that transactions will be matched, reducing the need for them 
to be held on the balance sheet for a long time and generating income primarily from the bid-ask spread.
TRADING AND EXECUTION PROCESS
Figure 2
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brokers for receiving their order flow. Thus, some brokers may offer their clients zero-
commission trading, opening up access to small investors.7 
Professional investors have access to the prime brokerage services offered by 
investment banks, which, in addition to acting as dealers, facilitate funds for their clients 
to take leveraged positions, be they in the form of exchange-traded derivatives, OTC 
derivatives, leveraged stock purchases or equity short sales.
With financing from one or several prime brokers, most sophisticated investors, 
like hedge funds, have leveraged long/short strategies, i.e. (long) buy positions on equity 
that may increase in value, and (short) sell positions on potentially overpriced equity. The 
proportion of hedge funds with biased long or short positions is much smaller (see Chart 6.1). 
In general, short positions on stocks are more costly to implement.8 Thus, to short-
sell stock, investors have to borrow it from their broker and deposit, as collateral, the cash 
proceeds from its sale on the market, plus an additional margin requirement to protect the 
lender from possible price rises. The short-seller expects the equity price to fall to buy it at a 
price that is lower than when it was borrowed, thus obtaining the price difference minus the 
loan fee. There is a recall risk if the lender claims the equity and few shares are available for 
purchase. There is also a funding liquidity risk, as the short-seller has to replenish collateral 
if the stock price goes up.
7  Off-exchange transactions grew in 2020-2021 and account for between 40%-50% of trading (see Bains et al. (2021)).
8  Lamont (2004) summarises short-sale constraints and how they can impact stock prices.
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4 GameStop and retail investors: pressures and feedback loop
The participation of small investors in the stock exchange market substantially increased 
during 2020, particularly through investment in individual stocks and the use of leveraged 
instruments.9 Added to structural changes such as the elimination of online broker fees 
and easy-to-use trading apps were conjunctural factors, like the greater time and savings 
available owing to the social effects of the pandemic on some population groups. In addition, 
the widespread use of social media (Twitter, YouTube, Reddit, etc.) and specialised internet 
fora (such as the WallStreetBets forum on Reddit) has acted like an echo chamber, making 
it easier for small investors to share information.
In early 2021, all of this had an impact on the share price of GameStop and other 
companies that had been in the spotlight of these online fora for several months. More 
specifically, their stocks soared in a short period of time owing mainly to retail activity in 
the options market. These were small-cap firms with a very high percentage of outstanding 
shares shorted by professional investors who, moreover, considered these companies as 
having been hit particularly hard by the pandemic and, therefore, expected their price to 
fall (see Charts 5.1 and 5.2). In the fora, individual investors identified these firms as overly 
exposed to bearish bets, particularly if activity were to return to normal soon (while also 
citing sentimental reasons, brand connection, group loyalty). 
Part of the retail investment flow was channelled through the purchase of call 
options with very short maturities and out-of-the-money strike prices (i.e. above the 
underlying asset’s market price) with little likelihood of being exercised, meaning leverage 
was very high. The shortage of shares available for sale (because they were heavily shorted) 
combined with the increase in call option positions (see Chart 5.4) put a number of upward 
pressures on trading, triggering self-reinforcing cycles of purchases and steep rises in the 
prices of these shares. Thus, GameStop rose by more than 2000% in January, with high 
intraday volatility (see Chart 5.3).
Initially, since they were heavily out of the money, the delta of these options was very 
low. Therefore, if a market-maker could not find a writer for these options, the cost of holding 
them was practically zero. However, when the price started climbing and approached the 
strike price, the delta of the options increased, as did the number of shares that the market-
maker needed to buy to hedge the market risk, pushing the price up further. These rises 
drew in new option and share purchases, increasing the delta even more. This feedback loop 
is known as a “gamma squeeze”.
At the same time, growing demand for these shares coupled with the price rises 
put pressure on the huge short positions, causing what is known as a “short squeeze”.10 
Either to limit losses, or due to the broker requiring additional collateral that the seller was 
 9  See Aramonte and Avalos (2021).
10   Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002) show how short selling can have these effects on the price.
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unwilling or unable to put up, short sellers were forced to buy back the shares and terminate 
the securities lending. This situation added more buyers to the market, leading to greater 
price increases and forcing more short positions to be covered. This deleveraging spiral also 
produced contagion effects on other shares owing to the de-grossing of long/short funds 
that reduced long positions, as they were forced to cover short positions, in turn leading 
other investors to reduce exposures as well. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN GAMESTOP SHARES: VOLUME, SHORT POSITIONS AND OPTIONS
Chart 5
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4  OPTIONS TRADED AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VOLUME OF SHARES
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5  Archegos Capital and its banks: deleveraging and liquidity spirals
Archegos Capital Management was a family office, i.e. it operated as an investment vehicle 
for the personal assets of a single person.11 Archegos invested in equities, using strategies 
typical of a highly leveraged long/short fund. During 2020, it took huge leveraged positions 
using equity swaps, concentrated in a small group of small and medium-sized Chinese and 
US communication and technology companies (including ViacomCBS, Discovery, Tencent 
Music and Baidu), which had a potentially lower pandemic-related risk and could therefore 
yield returns above the market index.12 The counterparties in these swaps were several 
investment banks which provided the fund with prime brokerage services (see Figure 1). 
According to some estimates, this leverage using swaps allowed its own buy 
transactions to account for a high percentage of the liquidity traded in this group of stocks. 
In some cases it held positions of between 10% and 25% of their capitalisation, without 
directly owning the shares,13 which remained the property of the investment banks which 
were the counterparties for these derivatives. 
Since these are relatively illiquid shares within the sector, it is believed that the buy 
pressure exerted by the investment bank counterparties to Archegos’ swap contracts was 
partly responsible for the strong revaluation of some of these stocks from April 2020. As 
the price rose, the fund had more capital at its disposal, allowing it to increase its positions 
in these firms by using new swaps and loan facilities with the investment banks and to 
maintain a high level of leverage despite the price rises. According to some reports, the fund 
may have had leverage of up to 10 to 1, with a combined long and short market position 
of between $50 billion and $100 billion and capital of around $10 billion,14 well above the 
average leverage of equity hedge funds (see Chart 6).15
At end-March 2021, Archegos experienced significant declines in its long positions 
while the market as a whole rose. ViacomCBS, which had appreciated 600% in less than a 
year, fell by more than 25% in one day, in the wake of an unsatisfactory capital increase and 
analysts’ pessimistic outlook (see Chart 7). Archegos was unable to provide the additional 
collateral required by the investment banks after the slump. The banks deemed this to be a 
breach of the derivatives contracts, triggering a spiral of forced liquidations.16
The banks that liquidated the stocks more quickly through block sales were able to 
limit their losses, but contributed to exacerbating the stock declines (see Chart 7). This caused 
11  It was therefore not subject to the regulation applicable to hedge funds.
12   One possible way to implement this type of long/short strategy is to be long in the stock basket and sell stock 
index futures.
13  See Zuckerman, Chung and Farrel (2021).
14  See Schatzker, Natarajan and Burton (2021). 
15   Following the episodes of stress and illiquidity since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, several regulators and central 
banks have pointed to the need for greater transparency regarding risks relating to hedge funds and other non-bank 
financial institutions (see Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2021) and Cunliffe (2020)).
16  See Das (2021).
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other investors to trim positions, either because of internal risk limits or for opportunistic 
reasons, triggering new margin calls, in a self-reinforcing cycle.17 The investment banks that 
acted as Archegos’ counterparties and kept the shares on their balance sheets for longer 
17   Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) analyse such trading pressures and the interactions between players with large 
positions, along with their impact on the market. 
HEGDE FUNDS VS. ARCHEGOS
Chart 6

































































































































CHANGES IN ARCHEGOS' PORTFOLIO
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ended up selling at a significant loss (see Chart 8). In all, the institutions affected reported 
losses of almost $10 billion.18
18  According to analysts’ estimates or data published by the affected institutions (see Abouhossein and Ranjan (2021))
IMPACT ON THE SHARE PRICE OF BANKS DEALING WITH ARCHEGOS
Chart 8
SOURCES: Bloomberg and own calculations.
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6 Conclusions 
Financial derivatives can be used as hedging instruments for managing the risk of portfolio 
positions, but also to multiply exposure to the underlying assets. Some of the volatility events 
of 2021 have been related to the use of derivatives to take positions in small-cap stocks. 
In these cases, because the stocks are illiquid, the derivatives have contributed to trading 
feedback loops, exacerbating sudden movements in the underlying prices.
Technological, social and market structure changes will continue to open up 
market access to small investors, in particular through the use of exchange-traded options 
to express a sentiment on a firm’s prospects. The balance between bullish and bearish 
stock option positions19 suggests that retail investor20 momentum has subsided since the 
January 2021 highs, but it remains ten times higher than it was two years ago (see Chart 9). 
Also, sophisticated investors’ use of derivatives and leverage in highly concentrated 
positions could be a source of stress for their bank counterparties under a scenario of 
declining prices of these positions or heightened volatility. In the case of Archegos, although 
the losses for some of the banks involved have been significant, contagion effects have been 
limited. In any event, a cautionary note should be sounded on the system’s risk-taking levels 
and aggregated leverage. In the United States, the year-on-year change in margin account 
19   Defined as the open interest for: (bought calls + written puts) - (bought puts + written calls).
20  Customers with positions of fewer or equal than 10 contracts.
US STOCK OPTIONS MARKET SENTIMENT INDICATOR BY CLIENT SIZE
Chart 9
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balances reached 70% in April 2021 (see Chart 10), surpassing the peaks recorded prior to 
the onset of the global financial crisis. In relative terms, this growth is more than 15% higher 
than the year-on-year change in the S&P 500 in 2021. In addition, available measures of 
some hedge funds’ leverage show an increase from the historical average (see Chart 6.2).
These episodes and their causes raise questions about the efficiency of some 
markets’ current structures when illiquid assets are traded and transactions are not 
sufficiently transparent. 
GROWTH OF MARGIN DEBT IN THE UNITED STATES
Chart 10
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